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I. CONDEMNATION AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
]FINVERSE Condemnation. In City of Dallas v. Ludwick I the city ap-
pealed an inverse condemnation judgment awarding damages to a
At landowner. Ludwick, the landowner, claimed that the city had taken
or damaged his property because it denied him a building permit on the
grounds that the building would be located in a proposed right-of-way for
street expansion. Subsequent to the denial of the building permit Ludwick
obtained approval for and built a smaller building. When he learned that
the city no longer intended to enlarge the street, Ludwick sued the city,
claiming that the denial of the building permit amounted to a taking under
the Texas Constitution.2 Reversing the trial court, the court of appeals
found that the denial of the building permit did not proximately cause any
damage to Ludwick because evidence showed that the original, larger
building could have been built on the tract without overlapping the pro-
posed right of way.3 The court further noted that there was no evidence
-that the relocation would have caused any loss in the building's value or
utility, or that the landowner would have been inconvenienced by the
change.4
Durden v. City of Grand Prairie5 was an inverse condemnation action in
which an improperly constructed storm sewer caused surface water to
drain across and damage the landowners' property. The landowners sued
for compensation for property taken and, in the alternative, damages
based upon theories of negligence and nuisance. The plaintiffs also sought
injunctive relief. The appellate court held that the continuous flow of
water across the property amounted to a taking under the Texas Constitu-
* B.B.A., The University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, Kleberg, Dyer, Redford & Weil, Corpus Christi, Texas.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ralph Martin Novak, Jr., Rick M.
Albers, John C. Brooke, and William H. Locke, Jr., Attorneys at Law, Kleberg, Dyer,
Redford & Weil, Corpus Christi, Texas.
1. 620 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. The Texas Constitution provides: "No person's property shall be taken, damaged
or destroyed for or applied to public use without adequate compensation being made .
TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
3. 620 S.W.2d at 632.
4. Id
5. 626 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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tion because the flow was of a recurring nature. 6 The court affirmed the
trial court's take nothing judgment, however, because the plaintiff failed to
introduce evidence relevant to the proper measure of damages.7 According
to the court the correct measure of damages for a taking is the difference
between the market value just before construction of the improvements
and the market value immediately after such construction. 8 The landown-
ers in this case failed to produce evidence of the market value of the prop-
erty immediately before and after 1969, the date when the storm sewer was
constructed.9
Eminent Domain. In United States v. 50 Acres of Land'0 the United States
condemned land the city of Duncanville owned and operated as a sanitary
landfill. In the condemnation suit Duncanville sought to recover substi-
tute-facilities compensation rather than the fair market value of the prop-
erty. I  Concluding that the city was entitled to recover only the fair
market value, the court stated that substitute-facilities value is only avail-
able when market value "cannot be determined or would provide inade-
quate compensation."' 2 The court further stated that property is subject to
the substitute-facilities measure of compensation only when the con-
demnee has a factual or legal obligation to replace the facilities.' 3 The
court concluded, however, that substitute-facilities value should not be
awarded when a fair market value can be established.' 4 The compensa-
tion required by the fifth amendment is that required to make the con-
demnee whole, and allowing substitute-facilities compensation in this case
would give a windfall to the city by replacing outdated facilities with mod-
em ones.' 5
6. Id. at 347. The court stated: "To establish a taking, in a case such as this, the
Durdens must establish that the injury to their property is repeated and recurring rather
than sporadic." Id. (citing Brazos River Authority v. Graham, 163 Tex. 167, 354 S.W.2d 99
(1961)).
7. 626 S.W.2d at 348.
8. Id. In deciding to measure damages as of the time of taking, the court rejected the
measure of recovery used in Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. I v.
Fowler, 175 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1943, writ ref d w.o.m.), in which the court
based damages upon the decrease in the property's value at the time of trial. The court
noted that in Durden the plaintiffs pleaded only for a taking under the constitution, whereas
the plaintiffs in Fowler asserted both a taking and damiges. Id at 347-48.
9. Id. at 348. The only evidence produced by the landowners to prove a decrease in
market value was a 1979 appraisal. The two-year statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs'
negligence and nuisance theories because the cause of action accrued in 1969 or shortly
thereafter. Id (citing the rule in Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681, 684
(Tex. 1975) that "an action for permanent damages to land accrues for limitations purposes
upon the first actionable injury").
10. 529 F. Supp. 220 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
11. The jury found that the cost of a substitute facility was substantially greater than the
fair market value of the condemned property. Id at 221.
12. Id. at 222. The court noted that market value is usually too difficult to determine
when either no market for the property exists or a prior sales price does not reflect the
current market value. Id.
13. Id
14. Id
15. Id. at 222-23. The court also held that the city had failed to introduce evidence to
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Restrictive Covenants. In Shaver v. Hunter 6 the court construed the single
family residency use requirement in a subdivision's restrictive covenants.
The covenant limited use of the lots to residential purposes and defined
residence to be a "single family dwelling."' 7 The defendant leased his
property in the subdivision to a nonprofit corporation that used the prop-
erty to house three severely handicapped unrelated single adult women
and a health care provider. Local homeowners brought suit for an injunc-
tion and alleged that the defendant's use of the property violated the sub-
division's single family residency restrictions. The defendant contended
that the covenant restricted only the type of building, not its use and occu-
pancy. Affirming the trial court's decision to enjoin the defendant, the
court of appeals held that the restrictive covenant was clearly intended to
restrict the use of the property to a single family residence.18
The court also disagreed with the defendant's contention that the four
unrelated single women were a single family and thereby complied with
the restrictive covenant.' 9 Relying on the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Southampton Civic Club v. Couch20 that a family is "a household, in-
cluding parents, children and servants, and, as the case may be, lodgers or
boarders," 2' the court concluded that four single adults could not consti-
tute a family.22 In response to defendant's additional argument that the
covenant was unenforceable as being against public policy, the court de-
cided that it would be unconstitutional to waive the covenant for handi-
capped people and yet enforce it against everyone else. 23
support its claim for interest on the difference between the amount of money deposited with
the court and the eventual condemnation award at a rate higher than the statutory six per-
cent. Id at 223-24.
16. 626 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. Id at 575.
18. Id. at 577. The court followed the general rule that use of the term "dwelling
house" in building restrictions refers to the structure's use rather than its form. Id. at 576-
77. The court acknowledged that when a covenant restricts only the type of structure rather
than the use, courts have allowed group living arrangements within the structure. Id at 576;
see Malcolm v. Shamie, 95 Mich. App. 132, 290 N.W.2d 101 (1980); J.T. Hobby & Son v.
Family Homes, 302 N.C. 64, 274 S.E.2d 174 (1981).
19. 626 S.W.2d at 577. The court noted that most courts in defining the term "single
family residence" construe "single family" to mean "nuclear family" or "extended family."
A nuclear family includes parents, children, and domestic servants. See Rudy v. Southamp-
ton Civic Club, 271 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). An extended
family "consists of a nucleus group of persons related by blood, marriage or adoption which
may include parents, children and collateral kinsmen such as grandparents, grandchildren,
uncles, aunts, nieces and the like" and may also include domestic servants and incidental
boarders. Id
20. 159 Tex. 464, 322 S.W.2d 516 (1958).
21. Id at 467, 322 S.W.2d at 518.
22. 626 S.W.2d at 578. The court noted that no Texas opinion had suggested expanding
the Southampton definition to cover four unrelated single adults. Id In a concurring opin-
ion Justice Countiss stated that he would define a family as "a stable housekeeping unit of
two or more persons who are emotionally attached to each other and share a relationship
that emulates traditional family values, promotes mutual protection, support, happiness,
physical well-being and intellectual growth and is not in violation of the penal laws." Id. at
579. Under this definition the four residents in Shaver could remain without violating the
covenant. Id.
23. Id. at 578-79.
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A restrictive covenant case of first impression in Texas was Turner v.
England,24 in which the defendants appealed a decision enjoining the con-
struction of a tennis court on their property. A restrictive covenant cover-
ing the property provided: "'No building, fence or other structure shall be
constructed on any building site nearer to the front lot line or nearer to the
side street line than the minimum setback required by the building line
shown on the recorded plat.' "s25 The trial court had granted the injunction
after finding that the concrete slab of the tennis court was a structure and
that a portion of the slab would be placed so as to violate the covenant.
Applying the general principle that "a restrictive covenant must be con-
strued strictly against those seeking to enforce it, resolving all doubts in
favor of a free use of the property, ' 26 the court of appeals held that the
concrete slab was not a structure within the meaning of the restrictive cov-
enant. 27 Consequently, the court held that construction of the tennis court
would not violate the covenant and dissolved the injunction.28
Attorneys'fees. Article 1293b provides that the court shall award attor-
neys' fees to a prevailing party in an action for breach of a restrictive cove-
nant pertaining to real property. 29 Two cases considered an issue of first
impression: whether the award of attorneys' fees under article 1293b is
mandatory or within the trial court's discretion. In Inwood North Home-
owners' Association, Inc. v. Meier30 the trial court refused to grant attor-
neys' fees for the plaintiff even though it ruled in the plaintiff's favor by
permanently enjoining the defendants' violation of a restrictive covenant.
On the basis of its interpretation of the statute the court of appeals re-
versed the trial court's denial of attorneys' fees.3 ' Applying the rule that
words of a statute should be given their plain meaning, the court con-
cluded that the use of the word "shall" in the statute rather than "may"
made the award of attorneys' fees under article 1293b mandatory rather
than permissive. 32 The court further held that the plaintiff did not forfeit
its right to attorneys' fees under article 1293b by incorrectly citing the stat-
ute number in its petition because the pleadings gave fair notice to the
defendants of the plaintiff's claim. 33 In Meyerland Community Improve-
24. 628 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
25. Id at 214.
26. Id at 216.
27. Id The court noted that within the same subdivision there were street lights, fences,
stone walls, paved driveways and a swimming pool beyond setback lines and that there was
no contention that they were structures. In addition, no part of the tennis court beyond the
setback line was to be above ground level. Id. at 215-16.
28. Id. at 216.
29. Article 1293b provides: "(a) In an action based on breach of a restrictive covenant
pertaining to real property, the court shall allow a prevailing party who asserted the action
for breach of a restrictive covenant, reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to his costs and
claim." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1293b (Vernon 1980).
30. 625 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, no writ).
31. Id
32. Id at 743-44.
33. Id at 744-45. The court also relied upon the policy that a party must complain of
technical defects in a timely and specific manner. Id at 745.
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ment Association v. Beilove 34 the court of appeals ruled that defendants
who prevailed in an action based on violation of restrictive covenants were
not entitled to recover attorneys' fees because article 1293b allows fees to
be awarded only to a prevailing plaintiff.35
II. MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMAN'S LIENS
Foreclosure. The court of appeals considered a deceptive trade practice
claim for wrongful foreclosure of a mechanics' and materialman's lien in
Dickinson State Bank v. Ogden .36 The Ogdens hired a builder to construct
a house and executed a mechanic's lien contract with power of sale. The
builder then pledged the contract and his note to a bank securing an in-
terim loan to finance the construction. The lien contract provided that
upon the contractor's failure to complete the improvements or provide the
materials and labor,
then contractor or other owner and holder of the herein described in-
debtedness and note shall have a valid and subsisting lien for said
contract price, less such amount as would be reasonably necessary to
complete said improvements according to said plans and specifica-
tions or in such event the owner and holder of the hereinabove men-
tioned indebtedness and note, at his option, shall have the right to
complete said improvements, and the liens herein given shall inure to
the benefit of said owner and holder.3
7
When the contractor subsequently defaulted, the bank posted the prop-
erty for foreclosure, and the Ogdens filed suit to enjoin the sale. After the
bank answered by filing suit to recover on its note and foreclose its lien,
the Ogdens asserted an additional cause of action under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act.38 The trial court rendered judgment for the property
owners, and the bank appealed, contending that the transaction was not
covered by the Act because the Ogdens were not consumers. Following
the definition of consumer in Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc. ,39 the court
of appeals determined that the property owners were consumers within the
meaning of the Act and thus were protected by its provision.40 The court
34. 624 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
35. Id. at 620-21. Defendants argued that they were entitled to attorneys' fees under
art. 2226, which allows fees to be recovered on a valid contract claim. See TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). The court rejected defendants' claim be-
cause they did not present a claim as required by the statute. 624 S.W.2d at 621.
36. 624 S.W.2d 214 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ granted).
37. Id at 219.
38. TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.62 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
39. 618 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. 1981). The Texas Supreme Court held in Cameron that "a
person need not seek or acquire goods or services furnished by the defendant to be a con-
sumer as defined in the [Act]." Id at 541. But see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (consumer is an individual who seeks or acquires any goods or
services).
40. 624 S.W.2d at 217. The property owners alleged that the bank violated the Act by:
"I. Representing that an agreement confers or involves the rights, remedies or obligations
which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law. 2. Breach of an express or
implied warranty. 3. Committing an unconscionable action or course of action." Id; see
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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held that the attempt to foreclose was a deceptive trade practice in that the
bank thereby represented that the lien contract conferred rights and reme-
dies that it did not have.4' According to the court the bank did not have a
right to foreclose its lien pursuant to the contract until a binding determi-
nation of the cost to complete the improvements had been made.42 The
court reasoned that "[pirior to that time the trustee making the sale would
be unable to determine how much to pay the owner of the note pursuant to
his responsibility of making disbursement of the proceeds of the sale."
43
The court allowed the Ogdens to recover three times the difference be-
tween the "increased cost [of completion] resulting from delay produced
by a deceptive trade practice" and the amount the bank recovered on its
note.44
Con version: Whir/pool Doctrine. P& TManufacturing Co. v. Exchange Sav-
ings & Loan Association 45 was a materialman's suit against an interim
lender for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. Exchange Savings &
Loan, the interim finance construction lender, had foreclosed deed of trust
liens and refused to let P&T remove certain cabinets and countertops that
P&T had installed on the property. Although P&T contended that it had a
materialman's lien on the cabinets and countertops at the time of the fore-
closure, it did not sue to foreclose its alleged lien. Instead, P&T took the
position that the lender had converted the cabinets and countertops.
Finding that P&T had no cause of action for either conversion or breach
of fiduciary duty, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment for the lender.46 For the purposes of its opinion the court as-
sumed that the cabinets and countertops could be removed without mate-
rial injury to the property or improvements.47 The appellate court held,
however, that as a matter of law a materialman may not seek removal of
property or assert conversion until he has judicially foreclosed his lien,
thereby establishing possession of the property.48 The court of appeals
also rejected P&T's claim that Exchange Savings & Loan had breached a
fiduciary duty, holding that an interim construction lender is not in the
position of a trustee to insure the payment of materialmen.49
41. 624 S.W.2d at 220; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(12) (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983).
42. 624 S.W.2d at 219-20.
43. Id.
44. Id at 221-22.
45. 633 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
46. Id
47. Id at 333; see First Nat'i Bank v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. 1974)
(materialman's lien is superior to prior deed of trust lien when property can be removed
without material injury to the land, to pre-existing improvements, or to property removed).
48. 633 S.W.2d at 333. Conversion requires an unlawful exercise of dominion and con-
trol over property in defiance of another's right to possess it. In this case P&T could only
establish a right to possession by foreclosing it's lien. Id
49. Id at 333-34.
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III. LANDLORD AND TENANT
Indefinite Lease Term. In Phipot v. Fields5" the landowner, by a written
and recorded lease, leased property to Fields for twenty years and as long
thereafter as he used it for a specified purpose. After the twenty-year term
had run, the landowner brought suit to have the lease declared unenforce-
able. The landowner asserted that the lease became a tenancy at will after
the twenty-year term expired and was thus terminable by either party. The
court of appeals decided that even though there was no definite duration,
the end of the term was "tied to the cessation of the use of the land for
certain definitely ascertainable purposes."5' Recognizing that perpetual
rights are not favored, the court stated that the clear intent of the parties to
create a perpetual right to lease the property should be enforced.
52
Forcible Detainer. The appellate court in Rushing v. Smith 5 3 considered
whether the county court could award damages to the nonprevailing party
in a forcible detainer action. When the plaintiff brought suit to recover
possession of real property, the justice court awarded possession to the
plaintiff subject to the defendant's right to harvest his crop.54 In his appeal
to the county court the defendant filed a cross action for the cost of prepar-
ing the crop and for attorneys' fees. The county court awarded the prop-
erty to the plaintiff and $3,300 to the defendant. The court of appeals
adopted the plaintiffs position that "the only damages recoverable in a
forcible detainer suit are those suffered by the prevailing party in with-
holding or defending possession, and court costs." 5 Because the defend-
ant was not the prevailing party, and his damages were unrelated to his
expense in defending possession, the court reformed the county court's
judgment by deleting the defendant's award of costs and attorneys' fees.56
The court noted, however, that the defendant could still bring an action in
a court of competent jurisdiction to recover his expenses. 57
IV. TITLE AND OWNERSHIP PROBLEMS
Condominium Owner's Tort Liability. One case during the survey period
decided the extent to which an individual condominium unit owner may
50. 633 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. Ct. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ).
51. Id at 548. The court noted that the lease specifically set forth the parties' rights and
obligations. Id Moreover, the lessee used the property in accordance with the lease contin-
uously since the beginning of the term and made timely payments of all rent. Id at 547.
52. Id. at 548. The court applied the rule that the parties' intent is given effect "when
expressed in an unambiguous writing." Id
53. 630 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
54. Right to actual possession is the only issue in a forcible detainer action. TEX. R.
Civ. P. 746. A suit for rent and attorneys' fees may be joined if it is within the jurisdictional
limits of the justice court. The court did indicate, however, that the defendant could main-
tain his suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. 630 S.W.2d at 500.
55. 630 S.W.2d at 499; see TEX. R. Civ. P. 752. The court decided that the limitation on
damages in rule 752 applies when a forcible detainer suit is joined with a cross action that
alleges other damages. 630 S.W.2d at 499.




be liable to a third party for tortious conduct that occurs in the condomin-
ium's common area. Owens v. Dutcher 58 involved tort liability for damage
to personal property resulting from a fire started by an improperly in-
stalled light fixture in the common area of a condominium. The tenants
who owned the property filed suit against the owner of the unit and others
to recover their damages. 59 The jury found that the negligence of the con-
dominium association, of which the owner was a member, was the sole
cause of the fire. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, but deter-
mined the amount of the defendant's liability by prorating the total
amount of damages determined by the jury on the basis of the owner's
undivided ownership share of the common elements. The tenants ap-
pealed the decision, contending that the owner should be liable for the
total damages, not just his proportionate share. Noting that neither case
law nor the Texas Condominium Act60 covered the issue, the court of ap-
peals relied upon the nature of condominium ownership in Texas to re-
verse the trial court.6' The court found that each unit owner is a tenant in
common with the other unit owners in the common property and is, there-
fore, jointly and severally liable for damage claims arising in the common
area.62 Consequently, the defendant unit owner was liable for one hun-
dred percent of the damages. 63
Construction of Deed. In Reeves v. Towery64 the defendants recorded a plat
of a subdivided tract of land and sold a lot to the plaintiffs by a deed
conveying "[aill that certain tract or parcel of land. . being Lot No. One
(1) in Section 'B' in GLEN OAKS SUBDIVISION ...as the same is
marked and designated upon the duly recorded map and plat of said sub-
division. '65 The recorded plat showed the notation "Reserved by Owner"
on a strip of land within lot one, but the general warranty deed conveying
the property did not contain the exception. The plaintiffs filed a trespass to
try title suit to have the strip of land declared their property. The trial
court found that the sellers had reserved the land in question by the nota-
tion on the plat. The court of appeals reversed and held that the deed
conveyed lot one in its entirety. 66 Applying traditional rules of construc-
tion to the deed, the court decided that the deed notation referred to land
58. 635 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ granted).
59. The tenants sued the owner of the condominium unit, the condominium association,
the electric company, the condominium developer, and a class of owners of the other condo-
minium units.
60. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1301a (Vernon 1980).
61. 635 S.W.2d at 209-11. In Texas the condominium concept involves the merger of
two estates: the unit owner has a fee simple in the unit and a tenancy in common in the
common elements. Id at 209.
62. Id at 211. The court stated: "In the absence of a statutory limitation, there appears
to be no escape-proof method of insulating the unit owners in a condominium regime from
unlimited liability resulting from negligent maintenance and operation of these premises."
Id at 210.
63. Id at 211.
64. 621 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
65. Id. at 211.
66. Id at 214.
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described in the plat and not to land conveyed. 67 In addition, the court
reasoned that the sellers could not have reserved any property to them-
selves prior to execution of the deed because they already owned the entire
lot in fee.68 The court also noted that the language of the deed conveyed
"all" the property. 69 According to the court the remaining words merely
made the description certain and did not constitute a reservation. 70
Purchases and Sales. Lefevere v. Sears71 involved a dispute over posses-
sion of harvested crops after a contract to purchase the land failed to close.
The plaintiff contracted to purchase from the defendant farm land on
which he had growing crops. The parties subsequently executed a written
amendment to the contract whereby the purchaser agreed to pay the cash
price by a certain date or the contract would terminate, and the seller
would acquire possession of the property and title to all growing crops.
When the sale failed to close by the agreed upon date, the seller harvested
and retained the crops. The purchaser filed suit to recover either the crops
or their value under equitable principles, alleging invalidity of the forfei-
ture provision. 72 The trial court ruled that the amendment converted the
sales contract into an option to purchase and reasoned that when the buyer
failed to exercise his option by the specified date, the seller was entitled to
the crops as liquidated damages.73 Reversing the trial court, the court of
appeals decided that instead of creating an option, the amendment merely
extended the time of payment and provided a penalty for failure to close. 74
Citing the rule that damages for breach of contract must provide just com-
pensation for the loss actually sustained, 75 the court further held that the
forfeiture provision was unenforceable as a penalty because it did not bear
a reasonable relation to the seller's actual damages.76
67. Id at 213.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id The court stated:
[T]he law relating to conveyances should remain ever such so as to require the
contracting parties, and especially the grantor, to make definite and certain the
meaning of the deed by the use of proper language which exactly and defi-
nitely describes the estate to be conveyed. Under no circumstances should the
law be relaxed to include within the purview of the deed, by construction, a
reservation solely to the owner a part of the land described in the grant unless
clearly compelled by the language in the deed itself.
Id.
71. 629 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
72. The purchaser did not file suit for specific performance of the purchase contract.
73. Id at 770. The court of appeals noted that there are no damages for failure to
exercise an option because the buyer is not obligated to purchase the property. Id
74. Id at 771.
75. See Stewart v. Basey, 150 Tex. 666, 245 S.W.2d 484 (1952).
76. 629 S.W.2d at 771-72. The court stated that in order to enforce the forfeiture provi-
sion the harm caused by the breach must be "incapable or difficult of estimation" and the
amount of liquidated damages must be "a reasonable forecast of just compensation." Id at
771; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 339 (1979); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.718(a) (Vernon 1968). The damages would be a penalty in this case because the
value of the crop was from $109,000 to $119,000 whereas the land was valued at $174,000.
629 S.W.2d at 772.
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Brokers. The court in Corman v. Carlson 77 considered whether a letter
that purported to be a commission agreement satisfied the requirements of
the Real Estate License Act. 78 A real estate agent had brought suit against
the owner of a shopping center to recover a commission for negotiating a
lease for space in the center. The only written agreement was a letter that
provided: "This letter is to serve as our commission agreement for negoti-
ating a lease with Denny's Inc. for a donut store at the Richardson East
Shopping Center located at Belt Line and Plano Road in Richardson,
Texas. Mr. Brown and Mr. Corman agree to pay Bob Carlson the com-
mission amount of $8,424."'79 The shopping center owner appealed the
trial court's ruling that the agent was entitled to the commission, claiming
that the letter was not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the Real Es-
tate License Act that a commission agreement must be in writing and
signed by the person to be charged. 80 The court of appeals tested the suffi-
ciency of the letter agreement under the statute of frauds standard that a
writing must contain or refer to the means by which the land may be de-
scribed with reasonable certainty.8' Noting that the property actually
leased was different from that described in the letter, the court decided that
the writing failed to satisfy the statute of frauds because it did not describe
the property to be leased with reasonable certainty.82
In a second case concerning real estate brokers, Canada v. Kearns, 83 the
plaintiffs purchased a real estate salesperson's own house, which was listed
with the defendant's agency. The purchasers filed suit against the defend-
ant broker to recover damages resulting from the salesperson's misrepre-
sentation about the condition of the roof. Appealing the trial court's
decision, the defendant contended that she was not liable as a broker be-
cause she did not receive a fee for the sale. 84 The court of appeals, how-
ever, decided that the defendant was a broker and that she was liable for
the misrepresentation because the seller was the broker's salesperson, and
the house was "advertised, listed, and sold through defendant's agency. 85
Statute of Frauds. The Texas Supreme Court in Nagle v. Nagle8 6 consid-
77. 638 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
78. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
79. 638 S.W.2d at 22.
80. Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6573a, § 20(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
81. 638 S.W.2d at 22;see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp.
1982-1983).
82. Id at 22. The court relied upon the rule that "[w]hen a writing describes land only
as part of a larger tract, without further identification of the tract to be conveyed, it will not
satisfy the statute of frauds." Id
83. 624 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
84. The Real Estate License Act provides that a real estate broker is one who sells or
lists real estate "for another person and for a fee, commission or valuable consideration, or
with the intention or in the expectation or on the promise of receiving or collecting a fee,
commission, or other valuable consideration from another person." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 6573a, § 2(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
85. 624 S.W.2d at 756. The court found that even though there was no fee paid to the
defendant, she "was motivated by the hope of receiving 'other valuable consideration.'" Id
86. 633 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1982).
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ered a claim based upon breach of an oral agreement to convey real estate.
The oral agreement arose out of a settlement proposal the plaintiff made to
her former husband who had failed to pay child support payments to the
plaintiff. In order to avoid appearing before the court in a contempt hear-
ing, the husband agreed to convey his interest in certain real estate to the
plaintiff.8 7 After the plaintiff's attorney passed the scheduled hearing, the
husband refused to make the conveyance. He did, however, pay the
missed amount of child support, which the plaintiff accepted. Neverthe-
less, the plaintiff, who had not attempted to reschedule the hearing,
brought suit to enforce the oral promise or to recover damages.88 The trial
court ordered the defendant to pay money damages, and the court of ap-
peals affirmed, holding that the plaintiff proved a cause of action for com-
mon law fraud.89
The Texas Supreme court first noted that under the statute of frauds the
promise had to be in writing to be enforceable.90 Although equitable ex-
ceptions to this requirement exist,91 the court found that no exception ap-
plied in this case.92  In particular, the court decided that promissory
estoppel did not apply to avoid the statute of frauds.93 According to the
court the plaintiff suffered no harm because she had the opportunity to
reschedule the hearing.94 Additionally, the court found that the plaintiff
did not have an action for common law fraud.95
Fraud. In Trenholm v. Ratclf 6 a homebuilder who purchased several lots
87. After the plaintiff's former husband missed making the payments plaintiff filed a
contempt motion and a hearing was set. Plaintiff then offered to forego the hearing and
waive one month's child support if her former husband would convey his interest in the
property, pay the child support not yet received, and increase the amount of future support
payments.
88. The plaintiff also asked for damages from her attorney if the claim against her for-
mer husband was denied. The trial court rendered a judgment n.o.v. for the attorney, and
the appellate court and supreme court affirmed. Id at 799, 801. Justice McGee concurred.
Id at 801.
89. Id at 799.
90. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1982-1983).
91. The court discussed the exceptions set forth in Hooks v. Bridgewater, Ill Tex. 122,
229 S.W. 1114 (1921) and "Moore" Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934
(Tex. 1972). Hooks provided that a contract is exempt from the statute of frauds if there has
been "payment of the consideration, adverse possession by the purchaser, and his making of
valuable and permanent improvements." 111 Tex. at 128, 229 S.W. at 1116. The court in
"Moore"Burger allowed a claim of promissory estoppel to defeat a statute of frauds defense.
The court in Nagle noted that the promissory estoppel exception had been limited to apply
to cases where the promise was to sign a written agreement that met the statute of frauds
requirements. 633 S.W.2d at 800.
92. 633 S.W.2d at 799-800.
93. Id at 800.
94. Id The court also concluded that the plaintiff's waiver of the support payment did
not constitute a substantial injury. Id
95. Id at 800-01. To support its decision the supreme court distinguished the cases
relied upon by the court of appeals in finding an action for fraud. Id
96. 636 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ granted). This is an appeal from
the second trial of the case. The first trial court rendered judgment for the home builder,
and the court of appeals reversed and remanded. Ratcliff v. Trenholm, 596 S.W.2d 645
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1980, writ refd n.r.e.).
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from the developer of a subdivision in order to construct and sell houses
brought a common law action in fraud and deceit against the developer.
At a meeting to promote the sale of the lots, the developer made a presen-
tation in which he described the location of a mobile home park adjacent
to the subdivision as a future shopping area and assured the homebuilder
that the mobile home park would be moved. The homebuilder proceeded
to construct six houses in the subdivision. During a second meeting the
developer conceded that there was no immediate plan to move the park,
but the homebuilder continued to purchase lots in the subdivision and
build houses.97 In the homebuilder's suit against the developer the issue
was whether the homebuilder relied upon the representation that the mo-
bile home park would be moved. The court of appeals held that as a mat-
ter of law the homebuilder did not rely upon the misrepresentation
because he purchased additional lots after learning that the mobile home
park would not be moved. 98 In addition, the court rejected the
homebuilder's theory that these lots were part of a "total building pro-
gram" and, therefore, reliance as to one lot meant reliance as to the rest.99
Additional Title And Ownership Problems. In Malone v. hifioeld °° the
court of appeals determined that a road situated between two private lots
had been acquired by the public through dedication and public acceptance
because sufficient evidence of public use existed.' 0 ' In a case involving
reformation of deeds, Thalman v. Martin ,102 the Texas Supreme Court or-
dered that two deeds be reformed because of a mutual mistake in the ex-
change of mineral interests. 03  Holding that the defendants had
established title by adverse possession, the court of appeals in Dalo v.
Laughlin 1o4concluded that the plaintiffs filing of a previous suit did not
toll the statute of limitations because the plaintiff had voluntarily
nonsuited. 105
V. MORTGAGES
Due on Sale Clauses. The Texas Supreme Court held the use of an op-
tional due on sale clause to be valid and enforceable in Sonny Arnold, Inc.
v. Sentry Savings Association. 06 A deed of trust contained a provision that
gave the lender the option to accelerate the entire balance of the debt if the
mortgaged property was sold. In addition, the agreement expressly pro-
97. The homebuilder entered into a joint venture with a savings and loan association
for the purchase of twelve additional lots. Five of the lots were purchased before the second
meeting and seven were purchased after the second meeting.
98. Id at 721. The homebuilder conceded that he could not have relied upon the mis-
representation as to the lots purchased after the second meeting.
99. Id
100. 621 S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
101. Id at 195.
102. 635 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1982).
103. Id at 414.
104. 636 S.W.2d 585 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
105. Id at 586, 589.
106. 633 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982).
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vided that the lender could increase the interest rate even if it approved of
the purchaser's credit and management ability. When the mortgaged
property was sold without the lender's consent, the lender accelerated the
balance of the debt and posted the property for trustee's sale.'0 7 Thereaf-
ter, the purchasers and seller sought a temporary injunction to enjoin the
trustee's sale. The injunction was denied at the trial level and granted by
the court of appeals in order to preserve its jurisdiction. 108 On appeal the
plaintiffs contended that the due on sale clause was invalid as an illegal
restraint on alienation. The court of appeals, however, upheld the use of
the clause and dissolved the writ of temporary injunction.1°9
Upholding the court of appeals decision to dissolve the writ, the Texas
Supreme Court decided that the clause was not an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. "10 The court first noted that the plaintiffs sought application
of the rule set out by the California Supreme Court in Wallenkamp v. Bank
of America,"' that "a due-on clause contained in a promissory note or
deed of trust cannot be enforced upon the occurrence of an outright sale
unless the lender can demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably neces-
sary to protect against impairment to its security or the risk of default."" 12
Before addressing the issue of reasonableness the court in Sonny Arnold
determined whether there was a restraint on alienation under the Restate-
ment of Property,' 3 which specifies three types of restraints: disabling,
promissory, and forfeiture." 4 Finding that the clause was neither a disa-
bling nor a forfeiture restraint because the clause did not void a convey-
ance or terminate a property interest, the court considered whether the
clause was a promissory restraint. "15 According to the court the restraint is
promissory if the clause attempts to "'cause a later conveyance to impose
contractual liability on the one who makes the later conveyance when such
liability results from a breach of an agreement not to convey.' 116 Because
the clause in question did not contain a promise not to convey and did not
impose contractual liability on the transferor, the court found that the
107. The lender had agreed to let the purchasers assume the debt if the interest rate on
the loan was raised from 9.75% to 10.5%. The terms of the sale, however, provided that the
purchasers did not assume the debt. Rather, the seller remained liable and agreed to indem-
nify the purchasers from any liability arising out of the debt or the deed of trust. Sonny
Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981), aft'd,
633 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982).
108. 615 S.W.2d at 334;see Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav. Ass'n, 602 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980), 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1981), aff'd, 633
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1982).
109. 615 S.W.2d at 340. For a report of this decision, see Butler, Real Property. Landlord
and Tenant, Mechanics' and Materialmen 's Liens, and Foreclosure, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 67, 91-93 (1982).
110. 633 S.W.2d at 815.
111. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385-86 (1978).
112. 582 P.2d at 976-77, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
113. 633 S.W.2d at 814-15.
114. Id. at 813, n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 404 (1944)).
115. 633 S.W.2d at 813-14.
116. Id at 814 (footnote omitted; emphasis by the court) (citing RESTATEMENT OF PROP-
ERT' § 404(I)(b) (1944)).
19831
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
clause was not the type of restraint on alienation prohibited by the Restate-
ment of Property.' 7 The court further noted that a contractual provision
for an acceleration remedy must be "clear and unequivocal" in order to be
enforceable. " 8 Under this standard the court found that the clause clearly
stated that there would be no acceleration if the transferee agreed to an
increase in the interest rate; therefore, the clause was valid and
enforceable. "19
Appointment of Substitute Trustee. The question in Springwoods Shopping
Center, Inc. v. University Savings Association ' 20 was whether mortgagors in
default had a wrongful foreclosure action against the mortgagee when the
property was sold by a substitute trustee who failed to comply with certain
deed of trust qualification requirements. The deed of trust' 2' provided
that the beneficiary could appoint a substitute trustee by merely putting
the appointment in writing and recording the writing. The instrument ap-
pointing the substitute trustee was not filed until two days after the foreclo-
sure sale. In their wrongful foreclosure suit the mortgagors claimed that
the sale conducted by the substitute trustee was invalid because he did not
have power to act as trustee until the proper notice was filed. As a defense
the mortgagee contended that the recording of the appointment is a minis-
terial act, and that the deed of trust provisions should not be strictly con-
strued.' 22 The court of appeals noted that Texas courts require strict
adherence to the deed of trust provisions because of the special nature of
the substitute trustee's position.' 23 Under this standard the court con-
cluded that the mortgagors did have a cause of action for wrongful foreclo-
117. 633 S.W.2d at 814-15.
118. Id at 815.
119. Id. at 815-16. The court concluded that a lender's requirement that a transferee
agree to a higher rate serves a valid business purpose. Id at 815. Justice Spears, joined by
Justices Campbell, Ray, and Wallace, wrote a concurring opinion in which he took the ap-
proach that the clause was a restraint on alienation and, therefore, the case should have been
decided on the basis'of reasonableness. Id. at 819. Nevertheless, Justice Spears agreed with
the outcome because the restraint was not unreasonable in this case. Id at 821. The concur-
ring justices found the distinction significant because basing the decision on reasonableness
would not foreclose consideration of other restraint provisions. Id
120. 635 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1982, writ granted).
121. The deed of trust secured a promissory note given in a loan transaction between the
mortgagors and the mortgagee. On the date that the mortgagee appointed the substitute
trustee, the mortgagors were several months behind in payments on the note. A few days
later the mortgagors received notice that the mortgagee was declaring the balance of the
note due, and that the substitute trustee would foreclose the liens under the note and deed of
trust.
122. The trial court granted a summary judgment for the mortgagors, but decreed that
they take nothing. Id
123. Id at 442. The court discussed the holdings in Burnett v. Manufacturer's Hanover
Trust Co., 593 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ reed n.r.e.), and Faine v.
Wilson, 192 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App.--Galveston 1946, no writ), that substitute trustee's
actions were invalid because the trustee did not comply with the appointment provisions.
Burnett held that a substitute trustee not appointed in accordance with the deed of trust
provisions is not authorized to sell property. 593 S.W.2d at 757. In Faine the court held that
the notices of sale were of no force and effect and that the sale was invalid because the




sure because the substitute trustee sold the property while he was not
properly appointed. 124
In Veltmann v. Hoffman 125 the mortgagees posted property for sale for
three consecutive months under the powers of their deed of trust. They
postponed the sale for the first two months in order to give the mortgagors
time to secure another loan. Prior to the date of the third scheduled fore-
closure sale, the mortgagors sought a temporary injunction to stop the sale,
claiming that the mortgagees had waived their right to nonjudicial foreclo-
sure by passing foreclosure the two previous months. 126 The court of ap-
peals, affirming the trial court's refusal to grant the injunction, held that
the mortgagees had not waived their right to foreclose. 127 The court stated
that it knew "of no case holding that a lienholder who, at the request of the
debtor, postpones a nonjudicial foreclosure sale in order to afford the
debtor an opportunity to avoid loss of his land is to be penalized by being
deprived of the right to foreclose."' 28
Miscellaneous Mortgage Cases. On the issue of subrogation the court of
appeals in Leonard v. Brazosport Bank129 held that a lien holder was con-
tractually and equitably subrogated to a prior valid lien holder's rights,
including the right to foreclose, because proceeds of the loan were used to
pay off the prior loan. 130 In Bank of Woodson v. Hibbitts13 1 the appellate
court found that a future indebtedness clause in a deed of trust executed by
a son, his wife, and his mother to secure a note did not secure four subse-
quent notes executed only by the son. 132
The court of appeals in Getto v. Gray 133 held that a debtor's payments
exceeding the minimum amount due under his note should have been
credited to the installments first maturing; therefore, the note was not in
default, and the noteholders could not accelerate the debt. 134 In Fretz Con-
struction Co. v. Southern National Bank 135 the Texas Supreme Court al-
lowed a construction contractor to prevail on the theory of promissory
estoppel against an interim construction lender who failed to set aside
funds from the loan adequate to pay the construction company. 136
124. 635 S.W.2d at 444.
125. 621 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, no writ).
126. The mortgagors also claimed estoppel.
127. Id. at 442-43. The court relied on Cox v. Medical Center Nat'l Bank, 424 S.W.2d
954, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ) (temporarily foregoing fore-
closure acts as a temporary waiver and does not estop the lien holder from effecting subse-
quent foreclosure).
128. 621 S.W.2d at 442.
129. 628 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
130. Id at 219 (citing Lewis v. Investors Sav. Ass'n, 411 S.W.2d 794, 796 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1967, no writ)).
131. 626 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
132. Id at 135.
133. 627 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston lst Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
134. Id at 440.
135. 626 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1981).
136. Id. at 481.
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